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Abstract 
  Intergovernmental relations are the responses that have been 
developed to facilitate cooperative policy making among divided governments 
within  a federal system. Intergovernmental relations are supposed to play a 
bridge-building role to bring a degree of coordination and cooperation to 
divided powers. Enforcing federal laws in the states is one  form of the 
interactions between the federal governments and states in federations. Today 
enforcement of federal laws and policies in the state in particular and the task 
of intergovernmental coordination in general are mainly done through the 
ruling party (EPRDF). Execution of federal laws and policies in the states 
using a party line has been  made smoothly for the last 28 years in Ethiopia.      
However, following the coming of PrimeMinister Abiy to power,  EPRDF lost 
the support of TPLF, its core allies on its stand in the process of enacting and 
executing   policies and laws. It, in turn, has led to gaps in the regularity and 
effectiveness in the implementation of federal laws in the states. Excessive 
reliance  on  party  channel  evokes the question of what will happen if more  
members( alliances)  manage to depart  from the ideology of  the EPRDF and  
whether under such contexts bring about  the collapse of the  Ethiopian 
federalism as well. Such risks call for the need to establish vibrant institution 
to coordinate the execution of federal laws in the states in Ethiopian federal 
system. 
 




European Scientific Journal July 2019 edition Vol.15, No.20 ISSN: 1857 – 7881 (Print) e - ISSN 1857- 7431 
19 
Introduction 
Constitutionally entrenched division of power between the federal and 
state governments is one of the core features of federations (Watts, 2001). In 
federations it is hardly possible to distribute administrative or legislative 
jurisdictions among governments within a single polity in to watertight 
compartments or to avoid overlaps of functions (Assefa, 2006). As a result, 
various forms of interactions and cooperations are expected to exist between 
the federal and state governments. Intergovernmental relation is one of those 
forms of interactions and cooperations. Intergovernmental relations are the 
responses that have been developed to facilitate cooperative policy making 
among divided governments within  federal system. 
  Intergovernmental relations are supposed to play a bridge-building role 
to bring a degree of coordination and cooperation to divided powers. 
According to professor Ronald Watts, intergovernmental interdependence 
within  a federation has two important dimensions. First, there are the vertical 
relations between governments of different orders i.e. federal- state relations 
and state-local relations (Watts, 1999). A second dimension is the horizontal 
relationship of different governments within the same sphere. These include 
inter-state or inter-local relations. Typically, in federations both kinds of 
relations have been important. Within each of these two dimensions, 
intergovernmental relations may involve all the governmental units within a 
federation (Watts, 1999). Article 50(2) of the FDRE Constitution hints a dual 
forms of federalism i.e. both the federal and state governments execute their 
own policies and laws using their own machineries in Ethiopia. 
 This article examines the mechanisms of enforcing federal laws in 
states in Ethiopian federalism. The first section of this article  highlights the 
theoretical foundations of intergovernmental relationships(IGR). Section 
two,on the other hand, discusses the division of legislative powers under 
FDRE Constitution. In addition,the third section deals with mechanisms of 
execution of federal laws in states in Ethiopian federalism. Moreover,section 
four elaborates resolving boundary and identity issues under FDRE 
Constitution.Finally, the last section critically examines the recently adopted 
law of   boundaries and identity issues of Ethiopia which are  the subject of 
controversies between the central government and the regional government of 
Tigray. Its constitutionality, mandates, and measures taken by Tigray National 
Regional State are also explored. 
 
1.  Conceptual Framework 
Federations often employ different mechanisms of enforcing federal 
laws and policies in their constituent units. One mechanism is by establishing 
dual structures in federal and state institutions. The other is by giving mandate 
to state institutions to execute federal legislations (Watts, 2001:45). 
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1.1  Dual (Competitive) federalism, which is very influential for many 
years, is sometimes called ‘layer-cake’ federalism. This mechanism holds that 
each level of governments  is supreme within its areas of responsibility. 
According to this model, one level of government is not dominant and should 
not interfere in the affairs of the other (Nice, and Frederickson, 1995:7).  Dual 
federalism is represented by the United States “Federation, where the 
allocation of executive authority is in principle considered co-extensive with 
the distribution of legislative responsibilities. This stems from the fact that, if 
the federal and state governments are to remain autonomous, then each must 
act directly towards the people in the process of enforcing its laws. As a result, 
it follows that not only legislative but also executive, financial and judicial 
powers should be divided between the federal government and the states so 
that each will act autonomously. A strict application of the principle results in 
a dual polity. In theory, dual federalism assumes little overlaps or sharing of 
functions between the two governments (Assefa ,2006:369). This model does 
not give responsibility for the state machineries in order to enforce federal 
laws and policies rather it sets up its own institutions in all states to discharge 
the task of enforcing federal laws (Ayana,2011:7). 
 
1.2  Executive (Cooperative) Federalism  
Executive federalism is one aspect of intergovernmental relations. 
“Even if, in theory , the system of coordinating policies and shared programs 
between the federal government and the states involve the elected and 
appointed officials , in parliamentary federations, it is often dominated by the 
executive branch of both governments hence the name executive federalism” 
(Assefa ,2006:371).This approach is widely applicable in European 
federations particularly in Switzerland, Germany and to some extent in India. 
Executive federalism holds that administrative responsibility does not 
coincide with legislative authority, administration for many areas of federal 
legislative authority being assigned by the constitution to the governments of 
the constituent units. This enables the federal legislature to lay down 
considerable uniform legislation while leaving this to be applied by regional 
governments in ways that take in to account of varying regional circumstances. 
Such an arrangement requires more extensive collaboration and coordination 
between the levels of government (Watts,1999:90).The idea is that federal 
government is responsible for the enactment of federal laws and policies 
whereas states are entrusted mainly for implementation of such laws and 
policies. 
 
1.3  The Notion of Intergovernmental Relations (IGR) 
Intergovernmental relations (IGR) are conventionally defined as 
important interactions between governmental units of all types and levels 
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within a political system(Wright,1988:12).The study of intergovernmental 
relation is not synonymous with the study of federalism: it is both a narrower 
in that it is one of the many aspects of every federal political system. A 
common characteristic of intergovernmental relations in all federal systems is 
their executive nature (Hugelin and Fenna,2006:216). On the other hand, it is 
broader in the sense that it is an aspect of not only of federal political systems 
but of all multi-tiered or multi-sphere political systems, including 
decentralized unitary systems and of con federal systems (Hugelin and 
Fenna,2006:216).  
The reason intergovernmental relations are so significant in multi-
sphere political systems is because it is impossible to distribute administrative 
or legislative jurisdictions among governments within a single polity in to 
clear compartments and to avoid overlap of functions. Interdependence 
between tiers of government within a multi-sphere regime is thus unavoidable. 
It should be noted that intergovernmental interdependence within a federation 
has two important dimensions. First, there is vertical relation between 
governments of different orders. i.e. federal – state relations and state-local 
relations. A second dimension is the horizontal relationship of different 
governments within the same sphere, such as inter- state or inter-local 
relations. In both kinds of relations all the government units are involved 
(Watts, 2003:14).  
Deil Wright has identified some common basic features of 
intergovernmental relations (IGR) (Wright, 1988:18).Firstly; IGR comprises 
all kinds of relations among the different levels of government. The relations 
can be legislative, financial or administrative in nature. Besides, they 
recognize vertical and horizontal types of relations. The former refers federal-
local, state-local, and federal-state relationships. The latter implies inter-local 
or interstate relationships. Secondly, there is involvement of public officials 
in all kinds of intergovernmental relations. As Anderson says “it is human 
beings clothed with office who are the real determiners of what the relations 
between the units of government will be. Consequently, the concept of 
intergovernmental relations necessarily has to be formulated largely in terms 
of human relation and human behaviors”(Wright ,1998;Anderson,2008). This 
implies that public officials such as members of the parliament, executives and 
experts of both federal and state government take part in day-to-day decision- 
making activities of intergovernmental co-operation and co-ordination. 
Thirdly, the relations of public officials are not going to be done at one 
time or occasionally. However, the relations are conducted continuously to 
exchange information and different views. Normally, the relations are not 
based on randomly or arbitrarily, but rather their relations are often scheduled 
and repeatedly done in order to get better achievements (Anderson,2008:66). 
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A final distinctive feature of IGR is its policy components. The basic agenda 
for intergovernmental relations is to discuss and pass decisions on some 
common policy issues. Therefore, the main concern of interactions of officials 
is consulting and discussing on some shared policies and programs. Policy 
consists of intentions and decisions of elected or appointed officials 
(Ibid,68).Policies can be generated by interactions among all elected or 
appointed public officials. Hence, the main concern of interactions of officials 
is consulting and discussing on some shared policies and programs. 
 
1.4  Rationale for Intergovernmental Relations 
The establishment of permanent forums of intergovernmental bond 
plays a crucial role in negotiation, non-hierarchical exchange of information 
as well as facilitation of cooperation between the institutions of the two levels 
of government. This will bring mutual respect and confidence between the 
levels of government. There could be various factors that render cooperation 
as well as coordination (Watts, 2001:43).This will bring mutual respect and 
confidence between the levels of government. There could be various factors 
that render cooperation as well as coordination between or among the tiers of 
government indispensable (Ibid,44). 
First, the difficulty of giving clear-cut jurisdiction for each level of 
government renders IGR necessary because “it is impossible to have a 
watertight distribution of administrative or legislative jurisdiction among 
governments or to avoid overlaps of function”. Shared programs are 
inevitable, and intergovernmental cooperation is one of the mechanisms of 
mitigating conflict in the course of such programs. In this respect, Steytler 
argues that “conflict between tiers of states may be inevitable because they 
would often compete for the same powers and resources. Where such conflict 
occurs, they should be settled in the spirit of cooperation (Steyler,2005:176).In 
this sense, IGR mechanisms are viewed as instruments that facilitate 
negotiation on matters that involve disagreement. Such interactions create 
mutual understanding between the two  governments. 
Second, intergovernmental relations can serve as “ means to adapt 
changing circumstances without having to resort to formal constitutional 
amendments”(Watts,1999:26). There are principles of co-operation implied 
from the concept of federalism that could overcome gaps in power 
distributions. The aim of intergovernmental relations are to make adjustment 
in the existing constitutional distribution of power rather than going through a 
rigorous constitutional amendment process, especially where the formal 
constitutional amendment procedures are rigid. (Ibid,28). 
Third, having effective and efficient intergovernmental relations will 
help to achieve, inter alia, policy coordination, consultation, sharing of 
experience between the tiers of governments and among states (Ibid,29).In a 
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nutshell, most federal systems have developed some kind of informal and 
formal structural processes to coordinate and facilitate inter-governmental 
relations. 
 
2. Division of legislative power under FDRE Constitution 
The combination within a single political system of shared rule and 
self- rule through the distribution of powers between the federal and regional 
governments, according to professor Ronald Watts, is the defining 
institutional characteristics of federations(Watts,2001:45). The specific form 
and allocation of the distribution of powers are predicted upon and determined 
by the existing political reality and social diversity, more specifically, the 
degrees and kinds of common interests and diversity, with in the particular 
society in question. Watts argues that, generally, the more the degree of 
homogeneity with in a society the greater the powers that have been allocated 
to the federal government and the more the degree of diversity the greater the 
powers that have been assigned to the constituent units of 
government(Watts,1999:14). 
The Ethiopian Constitution establishes a federal  structure that 
comprises two distinct entities, the federal state and the regional States. It 
defines and distributes powers and functions of the two entities. It requires 
both entities to respect the powers of one another (Assefa,2006:411).Each 
entity exercises legislative, executive and judicial powers within its allocated 
sphere and is autonomous from one another. 
Article 51 of the constitution lists 21 powers and functions of the 
federal government. Besides, there are other powers which are not mentioned 
in this provision but which are granted to the federal government. These 
include the power to enact labor, commercial and penal codes and to approve 
federal appointments submitted to the executive and to establish federal 
institutions. The powers of the regional governments of Ethiopia are envisaged 
under article 52(1). It states that “all powers not given expressly to the federal 
government alone or concurrently to the federal government and the states are 
reserved to the states”. Besides, more powers are granted to the states under 
article 52(2) of the constitution. The federal constitution has empowered 
regional governments to enact and execute the state constitution and other 
laws. To this end, the constitution provides that the states with a legislature, 
an executive and a judiciary which are constitutionally independent and from 
the central government in matters assigned to them. 
 
3. Mechanisms of implementation of federal laws in states in 
Ethiopian Federal system 
According to the FDRE Constitution, each government has the power 
of legislation and execution on matters that fall under the respective 
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jurisdictions. Each level of government shall respect the power of the other. 
At the federal level, executive power of the federal government is vested  with 
the Prime Minister and the Council of Ministers. The Prime Minister shall 
follow up and ensure the implementation of laws, policies, directives and other 
decisions made by the federal legislature (HOPR)(FDRE Constitution,article 
74(3). Article 50(2) of the constitution declares that the federal government 
and the states shall have legislative, executive and judicial powers’ which 
suggests that the organization of the federal executive is co-extensive with the 
division of legislative power.Thus, there  is a federal executive which is 
entrusted to enforce federal laws and  parallel  to state executive that is 
responsible to implement state laws. 
Thus, in principle, the Ethiopian Constitution follows a USA -model 
structure by reserving the executive responsibility to each level of government 
on matters in which they exercise the legislative powers.Now, the Ethiopian 
Federalism employs different mechanisms to facilitate the enforcement of 
federal laws  in the regional governments. These are briefly elaborated in the 
following paragraphs. 
 
3.1  Delegation 
One of the mechanisms  for promoting intergovernmental cooperation 
in a federal system is the delegation of power from one level of government 
to the other (Solomon, 2006:9). Delegation of power is  provided under article 
50(9) of  the FDRE constitution which states “the federal government may, 
when necessary, delegate to the states powers and functions granted to it by 
article 51 of this constitution.” However, this provision seems to delegate 
legislative, executive or adjudicative functions. Nevertheless, practices 
indicate that the federal government has mainly granted administrative powers 
to the states rather than legislative powers. The states are given delegation to 
enact their own laws in order to administer the utilization and conservation of 
land and natural resources in accordance with the federal laws. Both the 
federal government and the states seem to have parallel powers (Ibid,99).The 
point is that the federal government enacts general legislations on utilization 
of land and states are also empowered to issue specific and detailed laws in 
order to implement and administer the same in accordance with the federal 
law enacted by the House of the Peoples’ Representatives (Ibid,101). 
Except some constitutional provisions related to courts, delegation of 
other powers is not done in a comprehensive approach. Instead, delegation of 
administrative powers to the states is often done on piecemeal basis 
(Assefa,2006:398). Just to mention one instance, following the 2005 national 
and regional election, the Ministry of Justice has delegated its prosecution 
powers to justice bureaus of regional governments. Consequently, the former 
branch offices of federal prosecution in almost all states except in Addis 
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Ababa and Dire Dawa have been closed and the task of prosecution of Ministry 
of Justice has been carried out by justice bureaus of regional governments. 
However, such delegation has not been done formally as provided in the 
constitution. 
 
 3.2.  The Importance of Party Line for Intergovernmental Relations  
Political parties play significant role in determining how a written 
constitution operates ( Anderson,2008:66). William Ricker wrote “the 
structure of the system of political parties is what encourages or discourages 
the maintenance of the federal bargaining” (Ricker,1988:187). He also 
asserted that “the proximate cause of variations in the degree of centralization 
in the constitutional structure of federalism is the variable in degree of party 
centralization (Ibid,188). Accepting the fact that party systems can exert 
centralizing or decentralizing influences on federal systems, Edward Gibson 
argued that federal systems can, shape the nature of party competition, the 
structures of incentives for politicians, and the decentralization of parties and 
party systems (Gibson,1987:151).George Andersen also concluded, “Political 
parties are basic to the functioning of federations. The character of parties and 
of the party system reflect political cleavages within the population and 
partisan history, but are also significantly shaped by electoral laws and 
constitutional arrangements. Federations vary in having one dominant party, 
two or more major or many parties”(Anderson, 2008:49).  
If the officials of both sets of government are adherents of the same 
ideology or followers of the same leader or leaders, then they might be 
expected to pursue harmonious policies. But in all federations which have a 
relatively free society with competing political parties, just the converse 
occurs. In the heat of party struggle, competing parties use the central 
government against the constituent governments and vice versa (Anderson, 
2008:66). Intergovernmental conflicts may not  appear when one highly 
disciplined party controls both federal and the state governments.  
“In federations, there are two extreme situations with so many other 
options in between. Firstly, if one homogenous political party 
controlled all governments both federal and the state, there would be 
no occasion for intergovernmental conflict. Secondly, if all constituent 
governments are controlled by one homogenous political party and the 
federal government by another, the degree of federal conflict would be 
tense. All existing federations are found between the above two 
extremes”(Assefa, 2006:392). 
 
This implies that if the federal government and states are controlled by 
different political parties, things may not be run smoothly. Instead, there might 
be conflicts between the federal government and the states.   
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The ruling coalition party, EPRDF, has a centralized internal party 
structure. The party congress is at the top of the structure. The congress is 
made of equal number of delegates who are elected by each of the parties in 
the coalition. Each party in the coalition elects representative to the central 
committee. The central committee, which is the highest political body, decides 
on the overall programs of the coalition. Each party in the coalition elects 9 
representatives to 36 member’s executive committee, which manages the day 
to day activities of the coalition. The executive committee elects the 
chairperson of the coalition; who will be the chairperson of the central 
committee. Each party in the coalition has equal member of representatives in 
all the organs (Congress, Central Committee, and executive committee) of the 
EPRDF (Ibid,393). 
The central committee through the chairman generates broad issues of 
social, economic, and political matters, policy directions, plans and strategies 
that have nation-wide application. These plans and strategies are adopted at 
federal level and become the basis for state government plans and policies 
(Ibid,394). The internal party structure of the EPRDF is replicated by its four 
-member parties. Each member party has its own party program, which is 
usually in line with the EPRDF program. Each has its own councils at the 
regional, zone and woreda and  kebele levels of administration. Each is 
responsible to implement its party program, discuss and implement its own 
plans and strategies within its respective regions. Each party is also 
responsible to carry out the program of EPRDF within its own regional 
base(Ayana,2011:47).  
The interaction between the central ruling party and regional member 
and affiliate parties is characterized by what Paulos calls “patron-
clientism”(Paulos,2007:283). Regional parties are implementers of the 
policies adopted by the Ethiopian Peoples’ Revolutionary Democratic Front 
(EPRDF).The ruling party has its own representatives in regional states. By 
directly communicating with these representatives, the federal government 
can monitor the implementation of federal policies, programs and plans in 
regional states, and to render assistance in the capacity building pursuits of the 
latter. This has led some to conclude that there is currently a de facto one- 
party state (Merera,2007:35). 
The political landscape in Ethiopia reflects the electoral dominance of 
the EPRDF and the weakness of the opposition of parties. EPRDF is the party 
that holds over whelming majority seats in both  houses of the federal 
parliament. It also holds the majority seats in the councils of the Oromiya, 
Southern Nations, Nationalities, Amhara and Tigray States. This largely 
centralized party structure contradicts the division of power that exists in 
federations. The party line in Ethiopia is highly centralized. The ruling party 
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EPRDF with democratic centralism decides on many national policies and 
strategies(Assefa,2006:392). 
  The point is that the central committee of EPRDF through its chairman 
generates specific plans of action which are the basis of the EPRDF’s five-
year plan that are implemented nationwide. The five-year plans to be 
implemented are adopted at federal level and become the basis for state 
governments’ plans and policies(Solomon,2006:123). In this respect, both the 
central government and states can be influenced by the centralized party 
structure. The states might not get the chance to formulate policies on different 
matters in their jurisdictions as policies are predetermined and formulated by 
the centralized party structure. The states’ right to formulate and execute 
policies and strategies are thus highly affected(Assefa,2006:393). Therefore, 
we may conclude that the party line in Ethiopia influences the constitutional 
division of powers and the autonomy of the states which are developed in most 
federations (Ibid). However, following the coming of Prime Minister Abiy in 
to power,  EPRDF lost its core allies, TPLF.As a result, nowdays it is not easy 
to pass laws and policies  both in the federal parliament and executive body. 
A good example is the recent statute of Boundaries and Identity issues in 
which all 38 MPS from Tigray Regional State unanimously rejected the bill. 
Besides, the  parliament of the Regional Government of Tigray   rejected the 
adopted  proclamation and vows not to implement it on the region. This is the 
unique incident in Ethiopian politics which has not been seen  in the last 28 
years.  
In the absence of well-organized institutions to facilitate 
intergovernmental relations between the federal government and the states, 
party line can be used as a better option to accomplish such tasks. This is 
because the party line is currently well -organized. The prevalent political role 
of EPRDF and its partner political parties at both levels of federal and regional 
governments have created favorable and supportive political environments for 
building positive intergovernmental relations in Ethiopia (Assefa,2009:25). 
Members of the ruling party are used as good models to implement new 
policies and strategies in many rural areas. Having seen the efforts made by 
members of the party to implement new policies of the party, other non-
members of the community begin to carry out the same. Thus, the party line 
in Ethiopia is a good option to execute strategies and policies of federal 
government in the states (Ibid,26). 
 
3.3.  Relations of Some Federal Ministries with their Respective 
Bureaus 
In Ethiopia, virtually all ministries have their own family of 
intergovernmental mechanisms, and they have developed their own practice 
of cooperation and collaboration between the federal and regional 
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governments. The structures, processes, and practices have been developed 
between different federal Ministries and their regional counterpart bureaus in 
which all levels of government have a role. Thus, the Ministries of health, 
agriculture, education, trade and industry as well as regional sector bureaus 
have developed mechanisms and patterns to conduct intergovernmental 
relations that cover a wide range of functions (Assefa,2009:34). 
  Although many of the concepts and functions are common across 
ministries, their roles and structures vary for a variety of reasons. Cooperation 
concerning the better performance of responsibilities is actually facilitated 
through various forums, conferences, workshops, exchange of personnel and 
technical experts, or through personal exchange of information between the 
authorities of the levels of government.(Solomon,2006:98) . The meetings, 
discussions and other forms of cooperation between the center and the regions 
take place as the occasion demands. Some of them may remain as forms of 
informal cooperation between authorities, while others may evolve into more 
formal institutions with a clear mandate and staffed with skilled labor(Ibid,99).  
For instance, the Federal Ministry of Health and the health Bureaus 
Heads in regional governments work together in a mutual dependent manner 
in the process of implementing federal health policies and standards in the 
regional states. The ministry also provides technical assistance to the regional 
health bureaus. It often conducts regular meetings and conferences with 
regional health bureaus within three months. Led by Minister or State 
Minister, the main focus of coordination and cooperation include prevention 
of epidemic diseases such as malaria, HIV and others, capacity building, 
giving assistance and maximizing coverage of health services (Nigussie, 
2015:342). However, these relations suffer from many problems. Firstly, the 
relations are not governed by rules and procedures and are not done in regular 
basis. Secondly, the regional state health bureaus have not been consulted 
when strategic health plan was made. Thirdly, there is no sense of 
accountability when one of the partners (either the federal ministry or bureaus) 
does not comply with the common decisions(Ibid,343).   
An annual consultative forum between the Ministry of Education and 
sector bureaus has been established to strengthen the partnership between 
them. This forum creates a favorable opportunity to discuss how the national 
education policy is implemented throughout the country. The conferences are 
held in rotational basis through the regional states. In order to deal specific 
problems and issues of the concerned field, the ministry conducts a monthly 
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4. Resolving Boundaries and Identity Issues Under the FDRE 
Constitution 
The Federal government has a constitutional duty to ensure the 
observance of law and order in the country. Article 77(9)  of the FDRE  
Constitution also implies that it shall fulfill its duty when the sub national self-
administering entities are unable or unwilling to promptly address issues that 
have the potential to escalate in to a large –scale conflict to threaten the 
national public order and security of the people. Ethnic conflicts, identity and 
boundary issues among regional states in Ethiopia are granted in the 
constitution to the House of Federation, the upper house of parliament. While 
the lower house has legislative powers and its members are elected from 
districts within each regional state, the House of Federation has a different 
composition and role. It is composed of representatives from each of the 
nationalities. (FDRE Constitution, article 62(3). It does not have traditional 
legislative powers but rather is charged by the constitution with maintaining 
the country ethnic, regional and federal relationships and resolve identity and 
boundary issues.(FDRE Constitution, Article 62). This includes the role of 
dispute resolution and constitutional interpretation.  
Because the regional states are defined by their ethnic composition, the 
House of the Federation’s power with respect to nationalities, inter-state 
disputes are often ethnic disputes as well. Similarly, because the constitution 
establishes nationalities rather than individuals as the fundamental 
constituents‘ units of the Ethiopian federation, many aspects of the 
constitution and constitutional interpretation have at least some ethnic 
aspect.(Baylis,2004:559). The diminished legitimacy that the HOF has 
received at present and its institutional disorganization as well as proven 
ineffectiveness to timely address issues of identity and constitutional rights 
violations makes the current situation has worsened the situation (Ibid,560). 
 
5.  The Current law of Boundaries and Identity Issues of Ethiopia 
Currently, Ethiopia is facing heightened ethnic tensions in most 
regions of the country unlike never before. According to many, this poses the 
gravest of dangers to the unity and stability of the country. The boundary 
between the Benishangul-Gumuz and Oromia states is one front where 
numerous conflicts have been arisen recently and continued for the last two 
months .Hundreds of citizens have died and hundreds of thousands displaced. 
The issue is, in part, between the Kamashi people living across the border from 
Oromia and ethnic Oromos and Amharas living in the Regional State of 
Benishangul-Gumuz.   
In Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples' Region, several ethnic 
groups have passed resolutions indicating their wish to form separate 
statehood, including Sidama and the Wolayta. There were ethnic clashes this 
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year in the regional capital, Hawassa, in connection with identity questions 
(Ezega news, 20 December2018). There were also clashes between Oromo 
ethnic groups and other ethnic groups living in the region. The Oromia-Somali 
border was one of the earliest flashpoints of conflict in the country. Hundreds 
died over the years due to recurring conflicts, which resulted in one of the 
largest mass dislocations in Ethiopian history. The conflict subsided with the 
arrest of long-time Somali region leader Abdi Illey(Ibid). 
In the north part of the country, the Wolkite and Raya, which enclave 
in the Tigray Regional State, are contested by some activists from the Amhara 
region, perhaps with some backing from the Amhara Regional Government 
behind the scenes. There have been armed clashes in the Wolkite area and in 
some parts of Amhara, especially in Gondar, related to this issue. There were 
protests in the Raya area in Tigray in late October this year (Ibid).  
With the view to settle such boundary and identity issues in Ethiopia, 
Prime Minister Abiy has committed to establish the Administrative 
Demarcations & Identity Issues Commission. Drafted by the Office of the 
Prime Minister, the proclamation establishes such commission. The bill was 
tabled to parliament for legislation after it was unanimously approved by the 
Council of Ministers. The manner of the adoption of the new law was quite 
different in the parliament. It was not business as usual for the TPLF - a senior 
member of the coalitions in the ruling EPRDF. The party lost the support of 
its allies on its stand in parliament to stop the bill establishing the Commission. 
In parliament, the trend of the legislative body was to approve any legislation 
without much debate or presentation. Most of the bills submitted to the 
parliament usually receive unanimous approval due to the party's leadership 
role and its political culture of democratic centralism - deciding centrally and 
binding all members. 
Out of 350 members who attended the session in the parliament, 33 
votes who came from TPLF MPs opposed the bill entirely on the grounds of 
its "unconstitutionality". All TPLF MPs raised their hands in unison from the 
right side of parliament and voted to stop the formation of the Commission. 
Apparently, this situation indicates the winds of change in parliament as the 
vote was not unanimous and the customary adherence to democratic 
centralism seems to have vanished. 
 
5.1 The Mandate of the Commission 
According to articles 4 and 5 of Boundaries and Identity Issues 
Commission Establishment  Proclamation No.1101/2018, the core mandate  
(duty ) of the new Commission is to provide  alternative recommendations to 
the House of the Federation and the Prime Minister by studying problems and 
conflicts related to the administrative boundaries demarcation and issues of 
identity. Its additional roles include collecting public opinion on issues of 
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administrative boundaries, preparing a strategy and detailed plan, initiating the 
policy framework of administrative boundaries and facilitating ways in which 
conflicts can be resolved. All these assessments and recommendations will be 
forwarded to the parliament and Prime Minister for decisions (Ibid.Article 
5(6). 
This implies that the Commission’s mandate is just recommendatory. 
The Proclamation does not mandate the Commission to decide by its own on 
questions of identity and administrative boundaries which are primarily the 
power of the HOF. The Proclamation does not encourage the Commission to 
intervene in the substantive functions of these bodies; it only gives the 
Commission supportive and facilitation role.Nor does the proclamation 
impose any obligation on any government body to accept reports or 
recommendations submitted by the Commission. 
 
5.2  The Constitutionality of the Establishment of the Commission 
Members of the parliament of Tigray Regional State argued that the 
new law contradicts with the FDRE Constitution. One major contention issue 
raised  by MPs is that the commission usurps the power of the HOF. The 
principal argument of the author of this paper in this regard is that the new law 
does not take the power of the HOF.Instead, it pledges to reinforce the powers 
and functions of the HOF by establishing a supportive commission which is 
set to undertake professional studies and provide workable recommendations 
on the issues.The question of unconstitutionality does not arise as the 
proclamation explicitly states that the HOF has the full discretion to accept or 
not to accept the recommendations of the commission (Ibid,Article 
5(3).Nevertheless, HOF has not been invited to have a say as to how the 
commision should be established; its presence has become totally insignificant 
in the eyes of the new comers. 
The HOF is not and has never been the only government organ that 
deals with issues concerning ethnicity and administrative boundaries. Nor 
does the constitution provide that the HOF is the only organ to deal with inter-
state disputes. In the previous years, the Ministry of Federal Affairs had been 
the most active organ in dealing with such issue(Addis Standard,9 January 
2019). At present the Ministry of Peace which replaces the Ministry of Federal 
Affairs has the power to facilitate    the resolution of inter-state disputes 
without prejudice to article  48 and 62(2) of the FDRE Constitution. Thus, the 
House of Federation has the exclusive mandate to interpret the constitution 
and to give final determination on disputes, but it does not have exclusive 
rights to deal with issues of ethnicity and administrative boundaries. 
Another significant criticism forwarded against the new established 
commission by Tigray MPS is that it usurps the autonomy of regional states. 
The power to hear and decide on disputes over ethnic identity vests, in the first 
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instance, with the State Council concerned. However, the new proclamation 
divests those institutions of that power and hands it to the House of Federation 
via the Commission. In other words, the proclamation has in effect stripped 
the jurisdiction of  State Councils matters  relating to identity. As it has been 
discussed above, the commission does not possess any mandate to hear and 
decide  any disputes of ethnicity and identity. However, it  is responsible to 
investigate  identities and boundaries issues, collect opinions, facilitate ways 
in which conflicts can be resolved and provide recommendations to the Prime 
Minister, the HOF and the HoPR. The Commission does not decide by its own 
on questions of identity and administrative boundaries which are primarily the 
power of the HOF. 
 
5.3  Actions taken by Tigray National Regional   State 
Although MPs of Tigray Regional State fiercely debate opposing the 
bill on the commission of Boundaries and Identity Issues, the House of 
Peoples’ Representatives (Lower House) adopted it by majority vote. 
Following the adoption of the draft bill by the federal parliament, the 
parliament of Tigray National Regional State rejected the applicability of the 
new law on its meeting held on 27 January 2019. This creates  deadlock 
between the central government and the state of Tigray that  has not been seen 
for the last 28 years. The issue that comes next is that can constituents‘ units 
(states) nullify federal legislations in Ethiopia? 
The concept of federal laws in federations is the body of law created 
by federal government of a country that may be enforced though out the 
territory of a given country (Assefa, 2006:333). The experiences of executive 
federal system indicate that states are bound to execute federal legislations in 
their constituents‘ units until the alleged legislations are declared 
unconstitutional  through  an independent constitutional interpreter. Hence, 
states cannot nullify a given federal legislation by themselves. 
In our case at point, the act of the National Regional Government of 
Tigray in nullifying the proclamation that establishes the Boundaries and 
Identity Issues Commission  is against the established  norms and  principles 
of federalism. If the new law is found to contradict the Federal Constitution, 
the regional government   has a right to submit a complaint to the House of the 
Federation (HOF), Constitutional interpreter, for constitutional interpretation. 
 
6.  Conclusion  
Intergovernmental relations enable to promote   the culture of 
negotiation, and enhance the bargaining power of the regional states. Creating 
permanent forum for intergovernmental bond has a crucial role in negotiation, 
non-hierarchical exchange of information as well as facilitation of execution 
of federal laws in states. Execution of federal laws in states is one forms of 
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IGR. Because of the absence of vibrant and neutral institutions in execution of 
federal laws in states in Ethiopian federalism, the party line plays significant 
roles in this regard. Federal laws have been executed throughout Ethiopian 
territory using one dominant ruling party. However, recent developments 
indicate that the ruling party (EPRDF) is unable to legislate and decide 
common policy matters as it was doing so far before Prime Minister  Abiy 
came  to power. A good recent example is that the party could not take 
common political position in adopting the law of boundary and identity 
commission proclamation in the federal parliament, for the fact that strong 
opposition was arisen from  members of TPLF. The TPLF, one of the core 
allies of the ruling party, tried to stop the bill in the parliament debate. All 33 
MPS of Tigray Regional Government  voted against the adoption of the bill 
on the ground of its unconstitutionally.  
On top of that, the Regional parliament  of Tigray rejected the new law 
as unconstitutional  and vows not  to implement it in its entire region through 
its cabinate decision . This is a clear political deadlock developed between the 
federal government and the region following the coming of PM Abiy  to 
power. So as to facilitate  the  execution of  federal laws in states in Ethiopian 
federations, vibrant and neutral institution should be established. Besides, 
there should be frequent dialogues and negotiations among the allies of the 
ruling party to minimize their differences in policy making and executions. 
The new law on Boundary and Identity issues Commission should be 
fully implemented in many states of Ethiopia to solve the simmering intra-
state and inter-state tensions over questions of self- administration and 
boundaries.Othewise,  these would be escalating  into a large-scale conflict 
that may endanger not only the peace and stability of the concerned states but 
also the survival of the nation. 
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